Russia tests RS-24

Just quick and dirty: Russia successfully test-launched on Wednesday, November 26, for the third time its RS-24 ICBM. Read Pavel Podvig’s postings here and here for more information.

SS-19 tested

On October 22 the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces successfully performed a test-launch of a UR-100NUTTH/SS-19. The test was part of the checks needed to extend the service of the weapon until 2010.

The Rocket Forces are expected to conduct two more launches this year, one of which would be a test of the RS-24 missile. Moscow is highly optimistic that the upcoming RS-24 test will be successful; it already plans to put this type of missile in service in 2009.

Image © Риа Новости

Russia's reprisal options

There was no need to wait long until we get some “options” how Russia might react to the conclusion of the US-Polish agreement. RIA Novosti came up with an article by Yury Zaitsev, who is an academic adviser at the Russian Academy of Engineering Sciences. He writes that:

Russian missile defense systems will not be able to distinguish missile interceptors launched from Polish territory from ballistic missiles. Any launch of an interceptor will automatically result in retaliation, and not only at the interceptor deployment site.

This direct threat to Poland has to be seen in the light that Russia mentioned earlier that it could direct its missiles toward Poland in case it should decide to host the interceptor base.

Russia does not want to be dragged into another arms race, but it should not ignore the emerging threats. Its most obvious reply to the U.S. missile defense deployment would be equipping its Topol-M missiles with supersonic maneuverable warheads, using jammers, and reducing the boost phase of Russian missiles. It is also important to equip the armed forces with new MIRVed missiles.

Both ideas are not new. For some background information on the maneuverable warhead check the Missilethreat website. Russia is already working on MIRVed versions of the Topol-M, which are labeled RS-24. It is expected to complete the RS-24 flight tests program with the two launches scheduled for this year and, if the tests are successful, begin deployment of RS-24 in 2009.

Russia could also revive its program to develop global missiles, which could be put into near-Earth orbits and directed at enemy territory while bypassing missile defenses.

This is also a revamped idea: in the 1960’s the Soviet Union came up with the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). After launch an ICBM would go into a low Earth orbit and would then de-orbit for an attack. The clear military benefits of this program were that the missile had no range limit and the orbital flight path would not reveal the target location. While the FOBS program did not constitute a breach of the Outer Space Treaty, the program was phased out in January 1983 in compliance with the SALT II agreement, which explicitly banned fractional orbital missiles. However, the Reagan Administration withdrew from SALT II in 1986 after accusing the Soviets of violating the pact. Therefore there are currently no international obligations that ban Russian from reanimating FOBS.

[Russia] could also deploy Iskanders, with a range of up to 500 km, there. Initially any missiles in Kaliningrad would be strictly non-nuclear, but they could be equipped with nuclear warheads when Poland hosts the interceptors.

The frequent readers of my blog know that this idea is around for a while. Considerations exist to not only deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad but also in Belarus. Back in November 2007 Minsk has announced that the missile brigade, which will be equipped with Iskanders, will be deployed in the Mogilev Region, which is near the Russian border. This would mean that the US-interceptor-base at Redizikowo Pomorskie would be out of range, namely roughly 860km away which significantly exceeds the range of 280km of the Iskander-E (export) version. Only an updated version of the Iskander could put the interceptor base into reach but this would at the same time constitute a breach of Russia’s MTCR obligations. Back in May 2007 Sergej Ivanov said in an interview after an R-500 missile test that Russia will definitely not infringe its international MTCR obligations but the extension of the Iskander missiles’ range for Russia’s own purposes is a different issue.



Yury Zaitsev came up with another recommendation for Moscow how to formulate the sought “adequate response”:

[…] reducing the number of strategic offensive arms enhances the role of missile defense systems [and] therefore, Russia should keep an adequate nuclear deterrent in the next few decades, which must become one of the most important military and political tasks.

This is no surprise either. The importance of the Russian nuclear forces was stressed quite often in the recent time. The START I treaty will expire on 5 December 2009 and the SORT-of Moscow Treaty only regulates the number of warheads deployed by 31 December 2012. This is also the day on which the treaty loses all force. From that day on Russia will not be obliged to limit its nuclear arsenal in the future unless any follow-up agreements will be concluded. However, the technical and financial means for a major nuclear weapon expansion are not given. As examples serve the slow pace of the deployment of Topol-M missiles and the numerous failed tests of the Bulava missile. One option, of course, would be MIRVing existing missiles, as already mentioned above.

These are of course all worst-case options but as things are now there is no reason to be overly optimistic that Russia and the United States will find a negotiated solution any time soon. Probably a severe plunge in the oil-price would help but this is equally unlikely to happen soon.


UPDATE: Now we could hear the first nuclear threats in the direction of Poland. General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, a staunch supporter of Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin, pointed out that Russian doctrine permitted the use of nuclear weapons 'against the allies of countries having nuclear weapons if they in some way help them.'

Upcoming RS-24 tests

Yuri Solomonov, the chief designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, said in a recent interview to the VPK newspaper that the next test flights of the RS-24 (MIRVed Topol-M) are scheduled for the last quarter of 2008. If the tests are successful, the first RS-24 missiles will be operationally deployed in 2009. Pavel Podvig sees Solomonov’s comments in the light that they are good case against MIRVing Topol-M.

From Russia with Love

I would like to refer you to three recent posts by Pavel Podvig on the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces. The first one is about the Topol-M deployment in 2008 in which Pavel writes that the number will reach 65 by the end of the year. A second post lays out the rocket launch plans for 2008. Russia plans to conduct 11 missile launches this year, including two tests of the “new” RS-24, before this ICBM will enter service in 2009. Lastly, he reports on his Russiansforces blog that the Russian Military-Industrial Commission decided to continue the Bulava project as there are no alternatives to it.

Some additional news on Russia: the Russian-Indian joint venture BrahMos Aerospace announced another success. On March 6 another test of the sea-based version of the BrahMos cruise missile was conducted off Andamans coast. It was the 15th successive successful launch of the missile, but the first one that was aimed against a ground target. All previous test-launches had solely proven the sea to sea attack capability.

United Press International comments:

As we have noted over the past two years, India continues to forge ahead with its ambitious program to become a major power with its own domestically produced
intercontinental ballistic missile and cruise missile capabilities. India is even pushing ahead with its own ballistic missile defense programs, without buying from the United States the quantity and quality of BMD technology that other democratic nations such as Japan, Taiwan and Israel have all embraced. […]

Having said that, the BrahMos offers a remarkable opportunity for India and the DRDO to break that pattern [of difficulties with the transition from prototype achievements to the steady, reliable production,] because it involves such close association with Russian heavy industry in a field where only the United States can contest Russia globally -- the production of many types of reliable military missiles.